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Abstract 
 
Following Obergefell v. Hodges, same-sex marriage remains controversial and anti-LGBT state 
legislation has been passed, which raises questions about whether the Supreme Court’s ruling 
may have created a backlash. We use data from two waves of a general population survey of 
Nebraskans conducted before and after the decision to answer three questions. First, we test three 
theories of how the Court decision influenced public opinion. We find that support for same-sex 
marriage was significantly higher following the ruling, suggesting that there was not a backlash 
to it. Second, we assess whether people perceive that the court accurately reflects the public’s 
opinion. We find that people who favor same-sex marriage are more likely to think that the 
ruling refects public opinion very well; those who oppose same-sex marriage are more likely to 
think that the ruling does not at all reflect public opinion. Third, we examine the association 
between discussing gay rights and support for same-sex marriage, finding that those who talk 
about LGB issues very often are more likely to favor same-sex marriage. We discuss the 
implications of these findings in relation to two of the themes of this special issue: the influence 
of marriage equality on Americans’ understandings of marriage and the impact of marriage 
equality on future LGBT activism. 
Keywords:  same-sex marriage, public opinion, lesbian and gay movement, backlash, law 
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Introduction 
The issue of same-sex marriage has been a greatly debated and contested topic in the 
United States (Hopkins et al., 2013; Powell et al., 2010; Stone, 2012). Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in June 2015, Obergefell v. Hodges, that extended the recognition of same-sex 
marriage to the entire country, scholars addressed a range of facets relating to the topic, 
including but not limted to: how marriage become a focal point in LGBT activism and how the 
achievement of marriage would affect such activism (Fetner, 2008; Hull, 2006; Kimport 2014; 
Richman 2014), debate within gay and lesbian communities about the desirability of marriage 
(Bernstein and Taylor, 2013; Ettlebrick, 1997; Stoddard, 1997), and how visibility and 
recognition of same-sex marriage impacts public understandings of marriage and family 
(Badgett, 2010; Powell et al., 2010).  
The inquiry about if and how recognition of same-sex marriage may change Americans’ 
understandings about marriage and family mirrors questions about the relationship between 
Supreme Court decisions and public opinion, which have also garnered much attention among 
researchers. Research has shown both that Court rulings do and do not affect public opinion 
(Hoekstra and Segal, 1996; Rosenberg, 1991). Some work illustrates that following a widely 
publicized and visible decision dealing with a controversial issue, polarization might occur, 
which entails some groups’ opinions becoming more positive about the issue and some groups’ 
opinions becoming more negative (i.e. backlash) (Franklin and Kosaki, 1989). Arguably, the 
Obergefell v. Hodges can be considered one of many very visible cases dealing with a 
controversial topic. Moreover, since the ruling, some states have passed legislation that 
negatively impacts LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) individuals (Bauerlein and 
Kamp, 2016), which raises questions about whether the ruling on marriage created a backlash in 
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terms of public opinion on other LGB issues. People might also view the Court decision as 
ushering in social change that is not aligned with what the majority of Americans want, which 
could bolster a possibility of backlash (Kazyak, 2011; Parker and Barreto, 2013).  
In this article, we synthesize social science literature on public opinion and sexuality to 
assess opinion of same-sex marriage and other LGB issues following the achievement of same-
sex marriage. Specifically, we use data from a general population mail survey of Nebraskans 
conducted before and after the Supreme Court decision to examine three questions:  
1) How did the Supreme Court ruling Obergefell v. Hodges affect public opinion 
of same-sex marriage and other LGB issues?  
2) Do people perceive that the court decision accurately reflects the public’s 
opinion about same-sex marriage?  
3) Are people who talk about gay and lesbian issues more likely to support same-
sex marriage?  
We compare data from waves of the survey conducted in 2013 and 2015 to assess the impact of 
the ruling on Nebraskans’ opinions on four LGB issues: same-sex marriage, adoption by gay and 
lesbian couples, and protections for gay men and lesbians from housing and job discrimination. 
Our findings shed light on some of the implications of the achievement of same-sex marriage. 
We specifically are interested in two of the questions addressed in this special issue: “How has 
the achievement of marriage equality influenced public understandings of the institutions of 
marriage and family?” and “What impact has the achievement of same-sex marriage had on 
LGBT activism, communities and/or identities?” We assess the first question through examining 
people’s support for same-sex marriage. We discuss the implications of our findings with regard 
to how marriage equality might affect LGBT and anti-LGBT activism given both the general 
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public’s views on LGB issues and their discussion of these issues. Nebraska serves as an 
illustrative case study to examine these questions insofar as the state is more politically 
conversative than the national average and thus may be a context where backlash is more likely 
to occur.  
Literature Review 
 
Public Opinion Formation: Communication, False Consensus, and the Court 
 
Social scientists have addressed the myriad of factors that influence how people form 
opinions about social issues. Three factors in particular inform our analyses: communication, 
false consensus, and the Supreme Court. Scholars note how forming an opinion on a public issue 
is a process, not something that is straightforward or taken-for granted. Indeed, people form 
opinions in interactions and dialogues with others and engagement with media (Christen & 
Gunther, 2003; Eveland & Scheufele, 2001; Hoffman et al., 2007; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; 
Moy, Domke & Stamm, 2001). In this way, scholars note that processes of communication are 
important in forming an opinion about a public issue, which is why we address whether people 
discuss gay rights (Hypothesis 3). With respect to same-sex marriage, Michelson and Harrison 
(2017) argue that when a person engages in dialogue and interactions with another whom she 
respects and sees as like her, her opinions are likely to shift to align with theirs. For instance, 
they note that if a Republican-identified person sees other Republicans express support for same-
sex marriage, that person is likely to adjust their position to also be supportive. The importance 
of communication in forming an opinion underscores the degree to which individuals tell stories 
as a way to reach a conclusion about controversial social issues (Edgell et al., 2016).  
Also of relevance to the current analyses is that researchers have identified the “false 
consensus effect” or the fact that people often perceive their own opinions as relatively common 
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and perceive opposing opinions as relatively uncommon (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; Krueger 
and Clement, 1994; Wojcieszak and Price, 2009). For instance, Wojcieszak and Price (2009) 
analzyzed public opinion on gun control, the death penalty, and teaching morality in public 
schools and found that as individual’s support for these issues increased, so did their pereception 
that the public supported these issues. Moreover, they found that “encountering dissimilar 
opinions mitigates the association between individual position and perceived public opinion on 
the three contentious sociopolitical issues” (p. 39). This finding in conjunction with the emphasis 
on communicative processes point to the fact that being in dialogue with people, particular with 
people who do not share the same beliefs as you, may lessen the tendency to conflate your 
opinion with the opinion of the general population. This literature points to the importance of 
asking questions about whether people are discussing same-sex marriage and gay rights issues 
(given the emphasis on communication in developing opinion about social issues) and how 
people perceive what the public’s opinion is on these issues (given the emphasis on the false 
consensus effect); it is from this literature that we have developed our second and third research 
questions and hypotheses.  
Finally much work has addressed the Supreme Court and its impact on public opinion of 
social issues. Findings from the literature examining how Supreme Court decisions affect public 
opinion are mixed. For instance, some scholarship indicates that Supreme Court rulings shift 
public opinion to align with the Court’s decision (Christenson and Glick, 2015; Flores and 
Barclay, 2016; Hoekstra and Segal, 1996). The positive response or legitimacy hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 1a) suggests that, because the public views the Supreme Court in high esteem, the 
public is likely to respect the Court’s ruling or deem the Court’s ruling as legitimate and adjust 
their own opinions accordingly (Dahl, 1957). One recent exemplar that provides evidence for 
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this hypothesis is Christenson and Glick (2015), who found increased support for the individual 
mandate component of the Affordable Care Act following the Supreme Court’s ruling that 
upheld the mandate as constitutional. Work analyzing Supreme Court decisions on desegregation 
and interracial marriage show similar findings: that public opinion for both increased following 
the rulings (Carroll 2004; Combs and Combs 2003; Erskine 1973).  
On the other hand, research also finds that the Court either has no effect on public 
opinion (Marshall, 1988; Rosenberg, 1991) or that the rulings do have an impact, but that public 
opinion may actually shift in the opposite direction of the Court, reflecting a backlash 
(Hypothesis 1b) (Klarman, 2013; Persily, Egan, and Wallsten, 2006). Public opinion on gay 
rights, for instance, became more negative following the Supreme Court ruling Lawrence v. 
Texas that decriminalized same-sex sex (Engel, 2013). This shift may be explained by the fact 
that there was negative media coverage of the ruling, which included a greater focus on the 
opinions of those who opposed the ruling, including the dissent by Justice Scalia (Haider-
Markel, 2004; Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, and Allen, 2006). In addition, scholars argue that 
the degree to which LGB individuals are sexualized leads to less support of LGB rights (Persily, 
Egan, and Wallsten, 2006), which may have impacted public opinion following Lawrence v. 
Texas given that the case focused on same-sex sexual relations. Other work shows that 
individuals may perceive the court as moving “too fast” and being out of synch with public 
opinion on contentious social issues including gay rights (Irvine, 2005; Kazyak, 2011; Klarman, 
2013). Work that has focused on the impact of Supremt Court rulings on same-sex marriage, 
however, has found that no backlash occurred; the public’s support for same-sex marriage did 
not decline (Bishin et al. 2015; Flores and Barclay, 2016). 
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 Yet another perspective argues that Supreme Court rulings will affect the opinions of 
groups differently, known as the structural response hypothesis (Hypothesis 1c) (Franklin and 
Kosaki, 1989; Scott and Saunders, 2006a). According to this hypothesis, support will increase 
among groups that are likely to be predisposed to agree with the Court on a certain issue 
following a Court decision. In contrast, for groups that are likely to disagree with the Court on a 
certain issue, opposition to that issue among these groups will increase following a Court 
decision. Thus, polarization occurs. For instance, following Roe v. Wade, which legalized 
abortion, levels of opposition to abortion rose among Catholics (Franklin and Kosaki, 1989; 
Johnson and Martin, 1998). Likewise, following the decision that made sodomy laws 
unconstitutional (Lawrence v. Texas), women and liberals became more likely to support same-
sex relations (Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, and Allen, 2006). In addition, following the Iowa 
Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage, Democrats were among the groups whose 
opinions were more likely to become more supportive of same-sex marriage, while other groups, 
including Republicans and Evangelicals, were among those groups whose opinions did not 
change or became more negative (Kreitzer, Hamilton and Tolbert, 2014). Given the structural 
response hypothesis, it is important to understand which groups have been most and least 
supportive of same-sex marriage and other LGB issues. 
Public Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage and LGB Rights 
 
 Public support for same-sex marriage has increased in the past decades and a clear 
majority of Americans now support same-sex marriage (McCarthy, 2017; Pew Research, 2014). 
The increasing public support for same-sex marriage mirrors shifts in Americans’ acceptance of 
same-sex sexuality (Andersen & Fetner, 2008; Loftus 2001). Public opinion studies, however, 
show that levels of support vary among demographic, political, and religious groups (Baunach, 
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2012; Lewis, 2003; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison, 2006; Pew Research, 2013a; Powell, Yurk 
Quadlin, and Pizmony-Levy, 2015). Consistently, studies find that women, higher educated 
people, non-religious individuals, younger generations, and political liberals support same-sex 
marriage at higher levels than men, lower educated people, religious individuals, older 
generations, and political conservatives (Andersen and Fetner, 2008; Brumbaugh et al., 2008; 
Galupo and Pearl, 2007; Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2005, 2008; Kreitzer, Hamilton, and Tolbert, 
2014; Lewis, 2011; Lewis and Gossett, 2008; McCarthy, 2015, 2014; Sherkat, de Vries, and 
Creek, 2010; Whitehead, 2010; Woodford et al., 2012). Also, work has shown that heterosexual 
people who report having a personal connection to gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals are 
more likely to have a positive attitude towards gay rights (Fetner, 2016; Herek, 2002; Herek & 
Capitanio, 1996).  
Along with assessing public opinion on LGBQ rights and how it varies across groups, 
researchers have also discussed the changing social landscape with regard to sexuality more 
broadly and the impact that same-sex marriage might have for gay and lesbian couples, activism, 
and the general public’s understandings of marriage and family and support for other LGBTQ 
rights. Most relevant for our analyses (Hypothesis 1d and 1e), there are competing perspectives 
on these questions, with scholars emphasizing what they view as both negative and positive 
potential outcomes.  
Some scholars, for instance, discuss the possibility that same-sex marriage and increasing 
inclusion of LGBQ people into American society could lead to a backlash or a lessening of 
support and increasing hositility for LGBTQ rights and people. A backlash could manifest in 
different ways: public opinion reported on surveys (how we operationalize it in this paper), an 
increase in anti-LGBT groups’ mobilization, the introduction of other anti-LGBT legislation, or 
  
10
10
future Supreme Court cases that rescind LGBTQ rights. Parker and Barreto (2013) outline how 
reactionary anti-LGBT activism embodied in the Tea Party and its supporters is undergirded by 
certain groups, namely white, middle-class, heterosexual, evangelical Protestant men, feeling a 
sense of anxiety over what they view as a “displacement” of their values (p. 30). Anti-LGBT 
activists may continue to capitalize on this anxiety and work to make same-sex marriage a 
rallying issue to oppose following Obergefell in a similar way that anti-choice activists did with 
abortion following Roe v. Wade (Fetner, 2008; Klarman, 2013; Luker, 1984). Additionally, in the 
wake of marriage equality, states have introduced and passed laws that provide “religious 
exemptions” for certain services and benefits for LGBTQ persons as well as debated so-called 
“bathroom bills” that target transgender individuals (Miller 2017). Some argue that the surge in 
these laws illustrates a backlash to the Obergefell v. Hodges decision (Bauerlein and Kamp, 
2016; Thee-Brenan, 2016). Indeed, scholars contend that the narrow focus on marriage equality 
has been detrimental insofar as other LGBTQ and sexual freedom-related issues have received 
less attention and thus may garner less support (Pew Research, 2013b; Walters, 2014); and 
relatedly, the public may believe that LGB Americans experience full equality and thus may 
have less support for other issues that they do not view as being necessary (GLAAD, 2016). 
Further, the question of whether business owners should have to provide wedding services for 
same-sex couples has garned much media attention following Obergefell v. Hodges. The cases 
involving business owners denying services, such as the case that the Supreme Court is hearing 
in the fall of 2017 centering a Colorado baker who refused to make a wedding cake for a same-
sex couple, could be considered a backlash to the decision (Liptak, 2017). Finally, scholars have 
argued that same-sex marriage may be detrimental to queer visibility and to the ability to 
imagine queer ways of forming relationships (Duggan, 2004; Ettlebrick, 1997). 
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 In contrast, other scholars point to the rapid pace with which the public has embraced 
same-sex marriage (Fetner, 2016). Same-sex marriage has caputpaulted and monopolized the 
public’s attention in comparison to other LGB issues (Becker, 2014; Bernstein and Taylor, 2013; 
Kimport, 2014). Same-sex marriage has been the token gay rights issue since 2000, with judicial 
decisions, elections, and campaign rhetoric basically equating same-sex marriage with gay rights 
(Engel, 2013). Given this rhetoric, it may be the case that with marriage equality achieved, the 
public will embrace other LGB rights. Studies do indicate increasing public support for policies 
protecting LGB people from housing and job discrimination (Becker, 2014; Lax and Phillips, 
2009; Lewis and Rogers, 1999). Such work suggests that there may be an increase for LGB 
rights among the American public following the Obergefell decision. Additionally, there is some 
evidence that Americans have become more inclusive in their understandings of family and 
marriage and report more acceptance of same-sex couples (Powell et al, 2010). In this way, 
rather than view same-sex marriage as limiting the potential for visibility of queer culture and 
people, scholars contend that it may actually increase visibility as well as offer the ability to 
transform understandings of marriage (Bernstein, 2015; Green, 2013; Stoddard, 1997). 
Hypotheses 
Drawing on the literature outlined above, we have the following hypotheses about how 
the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling might affect public opinion of same-sex marriage and other LGB 
issues: 
H1a: The positive response or legitimacy hypothesis suggests that we should expect to 
observe an increase in support for same-sex marriage from 2013 to 2015.  
H1b: The backlash hypothesis suggests that we should expect to observe a decrease in 
support for same-sex marriage from 2013 to 2015.  
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H1c: The structural response hypothesis suggests that we should expect to observe an 
increase in support from 2013 to 2105 among groups that are more likely to support 
same-sex marriage, such as women, Democrats, and less religious individuals and a 
decrease in support among groups that are more likely to oppose same-sex marriage, 
such as men, Republicans, and religious individuals. 
We also draw on literature that discusses changes in attitudes towards LGBTQ rights and people 
more broadly and hypothesize: 
H1d: We should observe an increase in support for other LGB rights following the 2015 
Supreme Court decision.  
H1e: We should observe a decrease in support for other LGB rights following the 2015 
Supreme Court decision.  
Finally, since we are interested in how the decision may impact future activism, examined here 
by how the public views the court decision (i.e. if they view it as ushering in social change that is 
out of synch with what Americans want, which would bolster the possibility of a backlash) and 
whether the public discusses gay rights issues, we offer the following hypotheses:  
H2: Given the false consensus effect, we should expect that those who favor same-sex 
marriage will believe that the majority of others also favor same-sex marriage; thus, they 
should be more likely to perceive that the court decision accurately reflects the public’s 
opinion.  
H3: Since people form their opinions through interactions and communications with 
others, we should expect no difference between those who favor and oppose same-sex 
marriage with regard to whether they discuss gay rights.  
 
Methods 
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Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey (NASIS) 
We analyze data from the 2013 and 2015 waves of the Nebraska Annual Social Indicators 
Survey (NASIS). NASIS is an annual, cross-sectional, omnibus survey of Nebraska adults ages 
19 and older conducted by the Bureau of Sociological Research at the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln. The 2013 NASIS and 2015 NASIS were both mail surveys sent to randomly selected 
address-based samples—n=6,000 Nebraska households in 2013 and n=3,500 Nebraska 
households in 2015. Survey Sampling International (SSI) provided the address-based samples for 
both years. Respondents were selected within sampled households using the next birthday 
technique. NASIS 2013 included four mailings (initial survey packet, postcard reminder, and two 
replacement survey packets) during its data collection period from June 2013 to August 2014 
(NASIS 2012-2013 Methodology Report). NASIS 2015 included three mailings (initial survey 
packet, postcard reminder, and a replacement survey packet) during its data collection period 
from August 2015 to October 2015 (NASIS 2014-2015 Methodology Report). The initial 
mailing of the 2015 NASIS also included a $1 cash incentive. A total of n=1,608 respondents 
completed NASIS 2013 for a response rate of 27.3% (American Association for Public Opinion 
Research Response Rate 1 [AAPOR RR1]—AAPOR Standard Definitions 2009), and a total of 
n=1,143 respondents completed NASIS 2015 for a response rate of 32.7% (AAPOR RR1—
AAPOR Standard Definitions 2009). 
 NASIS 2013 and NASIS 2015 included the same four questions about LGB issues. The 
questions asked respondents whether they favor or oppose: same-sex marriage, adoption by gay 
and lesbian couples, and protections for gay men and lesbians from housing and job 
discrimination (see table 1 for question wording). NASIS 2015 also included questions about 
how often respondents talked about gay and lesbian issues as well as questions about their 
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perception of the Supreme Court decision representing the opinion of a majority of Americans 
and a majority of Nebraskans. 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
Nebraska Context: Strengths and Limitations 
We treat Nebraska as a case study of a more politically conservative state. Although not 
nationally generalizable, Nebraska’s composition provides a good opportunity to examine 
whether a backlash, especially among more politically conservative groups, results from the 
Supreme Court ruling on same-sex marriage. It is also an instructive case study insofar as the 
state is actually comparable to the rest of the nation when it comes to attitudes about LGBTQ 
rights. In 2013, the majority of Nebraskans supported same-sex marriage and other LGBTQ 
rights and Nebraskans’ opinions mirrored national public opinion on these issues (Stange and 
Kazyak, 2016). Nebraska is also fairly average when it comes to measures of religiosity. A Pew 
Research Study (2014) ranks it the 22nd most religious state, based on the percentage of residents 
who say religion is very important in their lives (54 percent), that they attend worship services 
weekly (39 percent), that they pray daily (52 percent), and that they believe in God with certainty 
(69 percent). Additionally, the NASIS surveys are a good data source to assess if and how the 
Supreme Court ruling on same-sex marriage impacts public opinion about LGB rights for a 
number of reasons. The 2015 survey was fielded two months after the Supreme Court ruling, 
which provides the opportunity to compare opinion pre- and post-ruling. Moreover, state-level 
public opinion data on same-sex marriage and other LGB issues is quite rare (Becker, 2014; 
Flores and Barclay, 2015, p. 2), making an analysis of data collected by the NASIS a unique 
opportunity. Finally, being able to examine multiple LGB issues, instead of only same-sex 
marriage, is a strength of NASIS data (Becker, 2014). 
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Our findings, however, are only generalizable to the Nebraska context. The demographic, 
makeup of Nebraska differs from other states in important ways, such as racial and ethnic 
diversity; a more racially and ethnically diverse sample could result in more positive attitudes on 
LGB rights related to discrimination yet more negative attitudes related to same-sex marriage 
(Lewis, 2003; Moore 2010). Another consideration is that our data also come from two waves of 
a longitudinal survey that had two separate, independent samples. A panel study with the same 
respondents reporting their opinions of LGB issues before and after the ruling would provide a 
more complete examination of how the ruling affected individuals’ opinions. Also, the 2015 
wave was conducted very shortly following the Obergefell decision (the first mailing was sent on 
August 12th and the decision was June 26th). Given that people’s attitudes about social and legal 
changes may not shift simulteanously with the changes themselves, it could be that we did not 
adequately capture negative sentiments just two months after the decision. Finally, it is important 
to note that the survey did not ask questions about transgender rights. This is an important 
limitation to highlight particulary given the degree to which scholars contend that hostility over 
transgender rights and the introduction of “bathroom bills” reflects a backlash to increasing gains 
of LGBT people, especially marriage equality. Indeed, research indicates less support for rights 
for transgender people compared to gays and lesbians (Lewis et al., 2017). Despite these 
limitations, our study uses a unique dataset from a more politically conservative state to 
understand how the Supreme Court ruling on same-sex marriage affects public opinion on this 
and other LGB issues.  
 
Analysis Plan 
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 We first report descriptive results of Nebraskans’ opinions of same-sex marriage, 
adoption of children by gay and lesbian couples, and protections for gay men and lesbians from 
housing and job discrimination for 2013 and 2015. Using two-tailed t-tests, we examine if the 
distribution of responses to these questions significantly differ between 2013 and 2015. Next, in 
regression models (logistic for favor/oppose outcomes and multinomial for the nominal 
outcomes of the same-sex marriage question–favor/favor civil unions only/oppose) using pooled 
2013 and 2015 NASIS data (n=2,751), we examine if the Supreme Court ruling affected opinions 
of LGB issues. The main independent variable is a dichotomous indicator of pre- (2013) or post-
ruling (2015). Control variables in the models include respondent demographic, political, and 
religious characteristics. Lastly, in additional regression models, we examine if opinions of 
same-sex marriage significantly differed pre-/post-ruling for men, women, Democrats, 
Republicans, Independents, those who do and do not identify as born again Christian, and those 
who do and do not personally know an LGB person.  
 To answer our second research question, we use chi-square tests with the NASIS 2015 
data to examine how people’s perceptions of the Court’s ruling reflecting marjority American 
and Nebraskan opinion relates to their own opinions of same-sex marriage. For our third research 
question, we use chi-square tests using NASIS 2015 data to examine if support for same-sex 
marriage differs by how often people discuss LGB issues. 
Weighting  
For our analyses, we use weighted NASIS data with the corresponding svy commands in 
Stata14. The data are weighted to account for within-household selection, unit nonresponse, and 
population characteristics. The weights for both 2013 and 2015 were for household size and sex, 
age, and region of Nebraska using 2010 US Census data (NASIS 2012-2013 Methodology 
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Report; NASIS, 2014-2015 Methodology Report). Table 2 displays the weighted demographic, 
political, and religious characteristics of the completed NASIS samples for 2013 and 2015. T-
tests indicate no significant differences in respondent characteristics between the 2013 and 2015 
data. One important exception is that more respondents in 2015 reported knowing an LGB 
person than in 2013. We control for this in the regression models and also return to the 
importance of this fact in the discussion in light of our other findings. The 2015 NASIS also 
asked whether respondents heard or read about the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling, and 92.6% of the 
sample reported yes,1 meaning the vast majority of respondents were aware of the ruling.  
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
Findings 
 
 Table 2 shows the distribution of Nebraskans’ opinions of LGB issues for 2013 and 2015. 
Support for all four LGB issues that we examined—same-sex marriage, adoption by gay and 
lesbian couples, and protections from discrimination in housing and employment—was 
nominally higher in 2015 than 2013 indicating there was not a backlash to the Court’s decision in 
terms of public opinion. T-tests show that significantly more Nebraskans favored same-sex 
marriage in 2015 than 2013 (40.5% vs. 48.04%; t=-3.13, p<0.01) and significantly more 
Nebraskans favored policies to protect LGB people from housing discrimination in 2015 than 
2013 (71.78% vs. 77.10%; t=-2.55, p<0.05). Differences in opinions between 2013 and 2015 
                                                        
1. A logistic regression model showed that people from Omaha and Lincoln and those who know 
an LGB person were significantly more likely to have heard about the ruling. No other 
demographic, political, or religious characteristics were statistically significant in the model, 
suggesting that other subgroups did not differ in the likelihood that they heard about the ruling. 
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were not statistically significant regarding adoption rights for gay and lesbian couples and 
policies to protect LGB people from job discrimination. 
 As seen in table 3, the indicator of pre-/post-Court ruling was statistically significant in 
the multinomial regression model predicting views of same-sex marriage by demographic, 
political, and religious characteristics of respondents (favor vs. oppose: Relative Risk Ratio 
[RRR]=1.63). This finding suggests that the Court’s ruling contributed to changes in public 
opinion even when controlling for demographic, political, and religious characteristics of 
respondents. Consistent with the t-tests, additional logistic regression models show that the pre-
/post-Court ruling indicator was not statistically significant for views on adoption rights for gay 
and lesbian couples and policies to protect LGB people from job discrimination. Support, 
however, was significantly higher for policies to protect LGB people from housing 
discrimination in 2015 than 2013, even when controlling for respondent demographic, political, 
and religious characteristics. Results of models predicting opinions of non-marriage LGB issues 
are available upon request. 
 In each regression model, the demographic, political, and religious characteristics of 
respondents were associated with views of the LGB issues in ways that are consistent with past 
research. For example, women, younger people, people with higher education levels, political 
liberals, and less religious individuals were significantly more supportive of LGB rights. In 
addition, respondents who live in Omaha and Lincoln – Nebraska’s two largest urban areas – 
were significantly more supportive of LGB rights than their counterparts in the less urban parts 
of the state. This result likely stems from residents of Omaha and Lincoln reporting, on average, 
significantly higher education levels, lower levels of religious identification, and identifying 
more as Democrats compared to respondents from the rest of the state. For example, 79.5% of 
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Omaha and Lincoln residents identified as religious while 89.2% of people in the rest of 
Nebraska identified as religious (t=-5.04, p<0.001). 
Similar to the findings reported in table 2, the indicator of pre-/post-ruling was 
statistically significant in the logistic regression model predicting support for policies to protect 
LGB people from housing discrimination (β=0.344, p=0.009) but not in the models predicting 
support for adoption by gay and lesbian couples (β=0.223, p=0.079) or policies to protect LGB 
people from job discrimination (β=0.226, p=0.106). For each of these models, respondent 
demographic, political, and religious characteristics were associated with support of LGB 
policies in ways that are consistent with past research. For example, women were signifincatly 
more likely to support all LGB policies compared to men. Full model results available upon 
request. 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
 Separate multinomial regression models for specific demographic, political, and religious 
groups show that opinions of same-sex marriage significantly differed before and after the Court 
ruling for some, but not all, groups (we do not report these tables due to space consideration, but 
they are available upon request). Similar to the trend among all respondents, in comparison to 
opposing same-sex marriage, support of same-sex marriage was significantly higher in 2015 than 
in 2013 for women (RRR=2.04, p<0.001), Democrats (RRR=2.41, p=0.004), Independents/other 
political party (RRR=2.28, p=0.008) and for respondents who do not identify as born again 
Christian (RRR=1.52, p=0.029) and for respondents who do not know an LGB person 
(RRR=2.04, p<0.001). Conversely, there was no significant difference in views of same-sex 
marriage between 2013 and 2015 for men (RRR=1.49, p=0.123) and Republicans (RRR=1.48, 
p=0.143), and those who know an LGB person (RRR=1.48, p=0.138).  
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 The change in views of same-sex marriage between 2013 and 2015 by gender, political 
party, born again Christian identity, and knowing a LGB person is evident in Table 4 which 
shows the distribution of opinions for these groups in 2013 and 2015. For example, while 44.2% 
of women favored same-sex marriage in 2013, significantly more women (52.8%) favored it in 
2015. Among men, however, 37.0% favored same-sex marriage in 2013 and 43.4% favored in 
2015, which was not a statistically significant increase. The differences among political parties is 
even more pronounced. In 2013, 64.4% of Democrats favored same-sex marriage, which 
significantly increased to 73.8% in 2015. Similarly, among Independents and those affiliated 
with other political parties, support for same-sex marriage significantly increased from 47.2% in 
2013 to 62.0% in 2015. The change between 2013 and 2015, however, was not statistically 
significant among Republicans: 19.9% favored same-sex marriage in 2013 and 24.3% favored it 
in 2015. Support increased between 2013 and 2015, though, among born again Christians (16.8% 
vs. 25.6%; t=-2.23, p=0.026) and those who do not identify as born again Christian (49.4% vs. 
56.8%; t=-2.56, p=0.011. Finally, 58.3% of those who reported knowing an LGB person in 2013 
favored same-sex marriage while 60.8% favored it in 2015, which is not a significant increase 
(t=-0.74, p=0.462); however, people who do not know an LGB person became significantly more 
supportive of same-sex marriage between 2013 and 2015 (25.3% vs. 33.7%; t-2.66, p=0.008). 
Overall, these findings suggest that support for same-sex marriage increased significantly 
among groups that have historically supported same-sex marriage at higher levels, while 
support/opposition was unchanged among groups that have historically been less supportive of 
same-sex marriage. Combined with the findings among all respondents, these data suggest there 
was not a backlash of public opinion in response to the 2015 Supreme Court ruling on same-sex 
marriage. Support increased among some groups and remained unchanged among others. 
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<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
Our next set of analyses examine respondents’ perceptions of the Supreme Court 
decision. Specificallly, we look at whether Nebraskans believe that the court’s ruling reflects the 
opinions of Americans and the opinions of Nebraskans. As seen in Table 5, views of same sex-
marriage significantly differs by how well respondents think the Court’s ruling reflects the 
opinion of a majority of Americans (X2(6)=720.03, p<0.001). Specifically, 95.0% of those who 
think the ruling reflects American opinion very well favor same-sex marriage, while 89.5% of 
those who think the opinion does not at all reflect American opinion oppose same-sex marriage. 
With regard to perceptions about Nebraskan public opinion, similar results emerge (table 6; 
X2(6)=450.41, p<0.001). These findings support the false consensus effect hypothesis. 
<INSERT TABLE 5> 
Finally, we assess whether there is an association between talking about gay and lesbian 
issues and support for same-sex marriage. Our results indicate that those who talk about gay and 
lesbian issues very often are more likely to favor same-sex marriage, while those who never talk 
about gay and lesbian issues are more likely to oppose same-sex marriage (table 6; X2(6)=56.36, 
p<0.001). Specifically, 69.2% percent of those people who reported talking about gay and 
lesbian issues very often reported that they support same-sex marriage, but only 28.9% of people 
who reported never talking about LGB issues reported that they favored same-sex marriage. In 
comparison, only 24.4% of people who said they talk about gay and lesbian issues very often 
said that they opposed same-sex marriage and 52.2% of respondents who said they never talk 
about gay and lesbian issues report that they opposed same-sex marriage. Although our results 
show a strong association, more research is needed to determine the causal direction between 
support for same-sex marriage and talking about LGB issues. 
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<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE> 
Discussion 
 
 Our results indicate support for the positive response or legitimacy hypothesis of how the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges affected public opinion of LGB issues. We 
observed a significant increase in support for same-sex marriage among Nebraskans from 2013 
to 2015. Additionally, we found that even when controlling for respondent demographic, 
political, and religious characteristics, there was a significant increase in support for same-sex 
marriage from 2013 to 2015. This finding suggests that the court had an influence on public 
opinion and, specifically, that public opinion shifted to be aligned with the Court’s decision. 
Moreover, our findings also support the structural response hypothesis insofar as the groups who 
tended to be pro-LGB rights became significantly more supportive of same-sex marriage, while 
other groups did not change significantly between years. For instance, women reported 
significantly higher levels of support for same-sex marriage, whereas men’s opinions remained 
statistically the same. Interestingly, we found that those who reported not knowing a LGB person 
(i.e. a group whose opinions we would expect either to not change or to become more negative) 
in fact reported significantly higher levels of support for same-sex marriage in 2015 than in 
2013.  
 We found no support for the backlash hypothesis. There was not an increase in 
opposition to same-sex marriage among Nebraskans following the Supreme Court ruling in 
2015. It is important to note that a backlash of public opinion did not occur even among groups 
who tend to be less supportive of same-sex marriage historically, such as born again Christians 
and Republicans. Moreover, we did not find an increase in opposition to other LGB rights issues 
(such as housing or employment protections). Our findings contrast previous research that did 
  
23
23
show that public opinion on LGB rights became more negative following the Supreme Court 
ruling that decriminalized same-sex sex (Lawrence v. Texas) (Engel, 2013; Stoutenborough, 
Haider-Markel, and Allen, 2006). The difference may reflect the extent to which media coverage 
following the 2015 marriage ruling was more positive than the coverage following the 2003 
sodomy ruling insofar as media coverage plays an important role in shaping how the public 
responds to Supreme Court decisions (Linos & Twist, 2016). It may also reflect the degree to 
which the Lawrence v. Texas ruling explicitly dealt with sexual relations in a way that the 
marriage ruling did not. We cannot assess these questions with the current study, but they 
warrant attention in future research. Future research could also analyze how born again 
Christians make sense of same-sex marriage and other LGB issues and what leads to some 
supporting such issues (Gjelten and Peñaloza, 2016). Additionally, the fact that there was an 
increase in support for same-sex marriage from people who reported not knowing an LGB 
person (also a group associated with lower level of support) raises questions that can be 
addressed in future research.  
 Despite the increase in support for same-sex marriage and lack of backlash, it is 
nonetheless important to note that we did not find an increase in support for other issues (with 
the exception of policies to protect LGB people from housing discrimination). This may indicate 
that, as some scholars predicted, the narrow focus on marriage means that the public will not see 
the importance of other issues and thus the embrace of marriage will not extend to support of 
other gay rights (GLAAD, 2016; Pew Research, 2013b; Walters, 2014). It could be that if 
activists are able to utilize similar strategies to make visible the negative impact of not having 
employment protections, for instance, we would see increasing support of these other issues with 
time. At the very least, our findings echo other research and point to the importance of 
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recognizing that there are differing levels of support depending on which LGB right is in 
question and offers a caution that the public’s support for same-sex marriage will not 
automatically translate into support for other LGB rights (Lax and Phillips, 2009; Powell et al., 
2010). Yet, related to another facet that scholars have debated with respect to the impact of 
same-sex marriage, we also find that there was an increase in the number of people who reported 
knowing an LGB person from 2013 to 2015. In light of this finding, research should continue to 
address how increasing legal protections translates into visibility of LGBQ people and 
relationships (Bernstein, 2015; Kimport, 2014).  
 Our analyses did reveal differences in how people perceived the Supreme Court’s ruling. 
Specifically, we found that the group of people who believe that the ruling reflects American and 
Nebraskan opinion very well are more likely to support same-sex marriage. In a similar vein, 
those who think that the ruling does not at all reflect the country or Nebraskan public opinion are 
more likely to oppose same-sex marriage. These findings are consistent with prior literature on 
the “false consensus effect” (Krueger and Clement, 1994) as each group assumes that their 
opinion aligns with the majority opinion. One implication of this finding is that people who are 
unsupportive of gay rights may view the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling as indicative of the 
Supreme Court members being liberal elites who are out of touch with the general public’s 
sentiments regarding same-sex marriage (Irvine, 2005; Kazyak, 2011). Such a sense might 
dovetail with the sentiment that gays and lesbians are gaining rights at the expense of what the 
“real” Americans (understood as heterosexual) value (Baretto et al., 2011; Parker & Baretto, 
2013).  
This implication is particularly important to consider in light our last finding that those 
who oppose same-sex marriage are more likely to never talk about gay rights issues. Scholars 
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who stress the importance of the communicative process in forming public opinion note that 
interacting and having dialogue with others not only shapes a person’s own perspective, but that 
it also may give that person a better understanding of others’ perspectives. In this way, 
communicating about a social issue may lessen the tendency to conflate your personal opinion 
with the opinion of the general public (Wojcieszak and Price, 2009). With the case of same-sex 
marriage, the majority of Americans in fact do support the right for same-sex couples to marry. 
Thus, despite the fact that of course not everyone agrees on the issue of same-sex marriage, the 
court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges is aligned with the majority of American’s and 
Nebraskan’s viewpoints. Those who do not talk about gay and lesbian issues and who are 
unsupportive of same-sex marriage may not have a good understanding of what other people’s 
perspectives actually are; they therefore may mistakenly assume that more people than actually 
do share their viewpoint and thus perceive that the court’s ruling is not aligned with the majority 
of American and Nebraskan opinion. The lack of dialogue about gay and lesbian issues among 
all Americans may perpetuate the misunderstanding of public opinion about same-sex marriage 
and thus the misunderstanding about whether the court was or was not aligned with the majority 
of the public. The degree to which these sentiments may continue to emerge and coalesce among 
some groups of people and anti-LGBT activists would mean that more negative opinions or 
backlash could be seen in future waves of the survey. 
 The findings that there was not a backlash in term of public opinion against same-sex 
marriage and other LGB issues among Nebraskans following Obergefell v. Hodges are also 
interesting to consider in light of recent legislation that critics argue repeal and reverse gains 
made with regard to LGBT rights (Epps 2016; Stern 2016). For instance, Mississippi and North 
Carolina have passed laws that allows business owners to deny services to individuals based on 
  
26
26
the owner’s religious views. Discussion of these bills are often framed around the rhetoric of 
“religious freedom” and some argue that their passage reflects opposition to the Supreme Court 
case extending marriage recognition for same-sex couples (Bauerlein and Kamp, 2016). Indeed, 
the Mississippi bill specifically outlines that business owners are able to deny wedding services 
to same-sex couples based on their religious beliefs (Stern, 2016). Likewise, the issue of 
transgender individuals and bathroom use has taken center stage in much of the debate of 
legislation passed in North Carolina and introduced in other states (Bauerlein, 2016). Thus, it is 
important for future research to address how public opinion on same-sex marriage may or may 
not align with how the public makes sense of other issues affecting LGBT individuals, 
particularly transgender rights. Moreover, the introduction and passage of anti-LGBT legislation 
following Obergefell reflects a backlash that is distinct from public opinion. Future work should 
focus on how state legislatures are successful in passing such legislation, especially if it passes 
despite a lack of public support.   
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Table 1: Wording of NASIS questions about LGB legal rights.
Question 
Response 
Options 
Do you favor or oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to legally 
marry? 
 
Favor 
Favor Civil Unions only 
Oppose 
 
Do you favor or oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to adopt 
children? 
 
Favor 
Oppose 
 
Do you favor or oppose laws to protect gay men and lesbians from 
housing discrimination? 
 
Favor 
Oppose 
 
Do you favor or oppose laws to protect gay men and lesbians from  
job discrimination? 
 
Favor 
Oppose 
 
Have you heard or read about the June 2015 Supreme Court ruling 
concerning same-sex marriage? 
 
Yes  
No 
 
How often would you say you talk to your family members, 
relatives, neighbors, coworkers, or close friends about gay and 
lesbian issues? 
 
 
Very often 
Often 
Sometimes 
Never 
 
How well do you think the Supreme Court’s decision reflects what 
the majority of Americans think about same-sex marriage? 
 
 
Very well 
Well 
Not well 
Not at all 
 
How well do you think the Supreme Court’s decisions reflects what 
the majority of Nebraskans think about same-sex marriage? 
 
Very well 
Well 
Not well 
Not at all 
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Table 2: Characteristics of NASIS respondents (weighted percentages). 
  
2013 2015 T-Value 
Sex  
Female 50.86 50.77 -0.06 
Male 49.14 49.23 0.06 
Age   
19-24 6.00 4.98 0.76 
25-34 16.77 17.11 -.16 
35-49 30.10 34.05 -1.63 
50-64 28.93 25.40 1.91 
65+ 18.20 18.46 -0.19 
Education   
HS or < 19.01 17.53 0.98 
Some College 36.26 35.08 0.58 
BA+ 44.74 47.39 -1.27 
Political Party    
Democrat 25.69 26.52 -0.17 
Republican 41.23 45.11 -1.70 
Independent 33.08* 28.37* 1.98 
Political Ideology    
Very Liberal 3.98 3.96 0.07 
Liberal 16.07 16.15 0.12 
Moderate 37.78 39.46 -0.92 
Conservative 32.51 30.59 0.82 
Very Conservative 9.67 9.84 0.06 
Born-Again Christian    
Yes 26.01 27.43 -0.44 
No 73.99 72.56 0.44 
Sexual Orientation    
Non-LGB 96.75 96.23 -1.03 
LGB 3.25 3.77 1.03 
Know LGB Person   
Yes 46.72* 52.81* 2.52 
No 53.28* 47.19* -2.52 
Heard about Obergefell v. Hodges Ruling    
Yes - 92.60  
No - 7.40  
Same-Sex Marriage    
Favor 40.54 48.04 -3.13** 
Favor Civil Unions Only 19.28 16.72 1.41 
Oppose 40.19 35.24 2.18* 
Adoption by Gay and Lesbian Couples    
Favor 55.87 58.95 -1.30 
Oppose 44.13 41.05 1.30 
Protection from Housing Discrimination    
Favor 71.78 77.10 -2.55* 
Oppose 28.22 22.90 2.55* 
Protection from Job Discrimination    
Favor 74.54 78.41 -1.90 
Oppose 25.46 21.59 1.90 
Note. *Indicates p<0.05 difference between 2013 and 2015 **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
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Table 3: Multinomial regression model predicting views of same-sex marriage by respondent characteristics 
and controlling for experimental treatments. 
  
Favor Same-Sex Marraige
a Favor Civil Unions Only
a
Relative 
Risk Ratio 
SE 
Relative Risk 
Ratio 
SE 
Pre-/Post-Ruling (2013=0, 2015=1) 1.63** 0.27 0.99 0.16 
Live in Omaha/Lincoln (Yes=1, No=0) 2.18*** 0.36 2.19*** 0.35 
Sex (Male=1, Female=0) 0.48*** .08 0.69* 0.11 
Age     
19-24 (Reference) - - - - 
25-34 0.56 0.38 0.41 0.27 
35-49 0.21* 0.14 0.41 0.26 
50-64 0.15** 0.10 0.37 0.23 
65+ 0.12** 0.08 0.32 0.20 
Education     
HS or < (Reference) - - - - 
Some College 1.47 0.37 1.11 0.27 
BA+ 2.71*** 0.71 2.02** 0.51 
Political Party     
Democrat (Reference) - -   
Republican 0.35*** 0.08 0.72 0.17 
Independent/Other 0.60* 0.13 0.82 0.19 
Political Ideology     
Very Liberal 1.36 0.85 0.52 0.39 
Liberal 1.80* 0.49 0.59 0.20 
Moderate (Reference) - - - - 
Conservative 0.29*** 0.06 0.87 0.16 
Very Conservative 0.11*** 0.05 0.29*** 0.09 
Religion (Yes=1, None=0) 0.50 0.18 0.68 0.29 
Born-Again Christian (Yes=1, No=0) 0.37*** 0.07 0.54** 0.10 
Religious Attendance     
Several Times a Week (Reference) - -   
Once a Week 0.93 0.44 0.88 0.29 
Nearly Every Week 1.26 0.63 0.88 0.32 
About once a month 4.23** 2.36 1.37 0.59 
Several times a year 3.12* 1.58 1.03 0.39 
About once a year 3.44* 1.98 1.76 0.78 
Less than once a year 4.88** 2.83 1.88 0.82 
Never 4.32* 2.47 1.62 0.76 
Religious Influence     
Very Much (Reference) - -   
Quite a Bit 1.62* 0.35 1.58* 0.32 
Some 2.76*** 0.77 1.72 0.42 
A Little 1.49 0.57 0.94 0.35 
None 1.98 0.91 0.70 0.38 
Know LGB Person (Yes=1, No=0) 3.38*** 0.58 2.04*** 0.34 
Sexual Orientation (LGB=1, Non-LGB=0) 1.03 0.87 0.23 0.26 
Intercept 2.77 2.48 1.26 1.06 
Note. a”Oppose” is the base outcome. N=2,170. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table 4. Views of same-sex marriage pre- and post-Supreme Court ruling by sex, political party affiliation, 
and Born Again Christian identity (weighted percentages). 
Favor Civil Unions Only Oppose 
2013 2015 T-value 2013 2015 T-value 2013 2015 T-value 
Sex 
Female 44.2 52.8 -2.92** 19.4 17.3 0.90 36.4 29.9 2.39* 
Male 37.0 43.4 -1.65 19.3 16.2 1.10 43.7 40.4 0.86 
Political Party 
Democrat 64.4 73.8 -2.39* 15.0 7.4 2.81** 20.6 18.9 0.54 
Republican 19.9 24.3 -1.37 22.6 24.5 -0.59 57.5 51.3 1.67 
Independent 47.2 62.0 -3.32*** 19.7 13.4 1.85 33.1 24.2 2.27* 
Born-AgainChristian 
Yes 16.8 25.6 -2.23* 19.4 14.7 1.29 63.8 59.7 0.89 
No 49.4 56.8 -2.56* 19.1 17.7 0.66 31.5 25.6 2.34* 
Know LGB Person 
Yes 58.3 60.8 -0.74 19.0 16.7 0.85 22.7 22.4 0.09 
No 25.3 33.7 -2.66** 19.6 16.9 1.11 55.0 49.4 1.69 
Note. N=2,170; *Indicates p<0.05 difference between 2013 and 2015 **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table 5. Views of same-sex marriage by how well respondents think Supreme Court ruling reflects majority 
public opinion, weighted percentages (NASIS 2015). 
View of Same-Sex Marriage 
X
2
 
(p-value) Favor 
Favor 
Civil Unions Only Oppose 
Reflects Majority American Opinion 
Very well 95.0 1.9 3.1 
720.03 
(<0.001) 
Well 78.7 13.3 8.0 
Somewhat 14.0 30.0 56.0 
Not at all 0.5 10.0 89.5 
Reflects Majority Nebraskan Opinion 
Very well 83.7 2.3 14.0 
450.41 
(<0.001) 
Well 86.6 8.7 4.7 
Somewhat 41.3 23.7 35 
Not at all 5.5 13.97 80.5 
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Table 6. Views of same-sex marriage by how often respondents talk about gay and lesbian 
issues. 
View of Same-Sex Marriage X2 
(p-value)Favor Favor Civil Unions Only Oppose 
Very often 69.2 6.4 24.4 
56.36 
(<0.001) 
Often 59.9 12.0 28.1 
Sometimes 42.7 18.6 38.8 
Never 28.9 18.9 52.2 
 
